Fishing Technology and Fleet Dynamics: Predictions from a Bioeconomic Model by Sampson, David B.
Marine Resource Economics, Volume 7, pp. 37-58 (V738-1360/92 $3.00 + .00
Printed in tbe USA. All ri^is reserved. Copyright © 1992 Marine Resources Foundation
Fishing Technology and Fleet Dynamics:
Predictions from a Bioeconomic Model
DAVID B. SAMPSON*
Portsmouth Polytechnic
Centre for Marine Resource Economics
Locksway Road, Milton
SOUTHSEA, Hampshire PO4 8JF
United Kingdom ,
Abstract Bioeconomic models of fisheries usually do not provide details of
fishermen's short-run behavior. This paper develops a model for the short-run
selection of fishing location by a profit-maximizing fisherman in an open-
access fishery given that fish density increases further from port and given that
fishing trips have a fixed duration. For any particular level offish price and
fish stock abundance, a fishing vessel's technical characteristics (fuel con-
sumption, catch rate, vessel speed) and economic characteristics (wage rates,
fuel price) determine the optimum location for fishing. A long-run model is
derived; the cost fiows for the fishing vessel and the biological dynamics are
added to the system. The models are applied to the evolution of a hypothetical
fishery in which fishermen utilize either an active fishing technology (trawlers)
or a passive one (long-liners).
Keywords Fishing technology, fleet dynamics, bioeconomic model, fishing
location, fishing cost functions.
Introduction
It is well established that an open-access fishery is economically inefficient (Gor-
don, 1953; Christy and Scott, 1965; Bell, 1978; Cunningham et al., 1985; Ander-
son, 1986); if the rate of fishing can be controlled, then the same annual catches
can be made at lower cost in a regulated fishery as are made in an unregulated one.
A major preoccupation of fisheries economists has been determining the best
method of regulation (limited entry, taxes, quotas) and finding the optimal time
path for its implementation (Clark, 1976, 1985). These issues are certainly relevant
to fisheries management, but they have distracted attention away from the devel-
opment of detailed and realistic models of open-access fishing.
Most of the literature on fisheries economics is concerned with long-run
pheonomena such as sustainable yields and optimum levels of investment. With
the notable exception of Doll (1988), there has been little consideration given to
the short-run aspects of fishing. In the short-run the skipper of a fishing vessel
cannot readily change his vessel or gear; hence the skipper's actions are relatively
limited. However, a skipper does regularly decide whether or not to go fishing and
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where to fish. These short-run decisions have a direct impact on the profitability
of fishing.
There have been few empirical studies of fishermen's short-run behavior.
Hilborn and Ledbetter (1979) examined the weekly movements of purse-seine
vessels fishing for Pacific salmon and they concluded that these fishermen moved
their operations in response to changes in the rates of revenue generation in
different areas. Eales and Wilen (1986) analyzed the fishing locations of Pacific
shrimp trawlers and they concluded that these fishermen were responsive to daily
changes in local shrimp abundance and that, unless the fishermen knew that they
could make larger catches on more distant grounds, they would not incur the extra
costs of traveling there. These papers discuss the notion that fishermen behave as
rational economic agents who seek to maximize expected profits. However, nei-
ther paper explicitly develops a model of the decision making process.
The analysis in this paper is based on a number of simplifying assumptions
from conventional microeconomic theory: the decision maker operates in a man-
ner that maximizes his fiow of profits; the decision maker has perfect knowledge
with regard to the quantity offish that he will catch, the costs that he will incur in
catching them, and the price that he will receive for them; the inputs and outputs
of the fishing process are of uniform quality and price. Of course these assump-
tions are not wholly justifiable. The assumption of perfect knowledge by the
fishermen is particularly unrealistic (Gates, 1984). However, the objective here is
not to construct a precise description of any particular fishery. Instead, the aim is
to build from first principles some models that reasonably imitate the main short-
run and long-run characteristics of a fishery and to examine the properties that
emerge from these models.
In the section that follows equations are derived which describe the short-run
selection of fishing location given that the density offish increases as one moves
further from port and given that the revenues from a fishing trip must at least
cover the operating costs. It is shown that the technical characteristics of the
fishing vessel and gear are important determinants of the optimum location for
fishing. Then the economic models are expanded to include the long-run costs of
the fishing vessel and gear and a biological model for the dynamics of the fish
stock is added to the system. It is shown that certain short-run economic con-
straints affect the long-run behavior of the fishery system. Finally, the models are
applied to an analysis of changes in the size and structure of a hypothetical fishing
fleet that can use either of two types of fishing technology. It is shown that the
composition of the fieet with regard to fishing technology behaves in a manner
that can be different from the forms of "technological progress" that are observed
in other industries.
A rather large number of variables and parameters are used in the model. They
are summarized in Table I.
The Short-Run Analysis
In any real fishery, the fish and the ports from which fishing vessels operate are
distributed irregularly in space and the relationship between density of fish and
distance from port is almost certainly a very complicated one. However, theFishing Technology and Fleet Dynamics
Table 1
The Variables and Parameters of the Model
D Spatial density of the fish biomass.
d Distance from the fishing port.
G Gradient for the fish density function.
B Biomass of the fish stock.
R Range (distance from port) of the fish stock.
dmin Minimum distance from port at which fish occur.
T Time duration of each fishing trip.
tF Amount of time spent fishing on a fishing trip.
V Speed of the vessel while steaming to the grounds.
dmax Maximum distance a vessel can travel during a trip.
C Catch per fishing trip.
q Catchability coefficient; catch rate while fishing.
uS Rate of use of fuel while steaming to the grounds.
uF Rate of use of fuel while fishing.
cE Costs for fuel (energy) per fishing trip.
pE Unit price of fuel (energy).
oc Operating costs per fishing trip.
cL Labor costs per fishing trip.
cM Miscellaneous costs per fishing trip.
S The crew's share of the catch, 0 =s S < 1.
SR Skipper's revenue per fishing trip.
p Unit price for fish biomass.
d* Optimum (profit maximizing) distance for fishing.
pmin Minimum supply price.
Bmin Minimum economic biomass.
C* Catch per trip when fishing at the optimum distance.
fc Flow of fixed costs.
PR Profit flow per vessel.
BB Breakeven biomass.
E Number of fishing vessels in the fleet.
e Vessel entry/exit coefficient.
r Intrinsic rate offish population growth.
K Carrying capacity; biomass of the unexploited stock.
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following are essential features that previously have received little attention from
fisheries scientists or economists: fishermen decide if and where to fish; the fish
are not uniformly distributed in the sea; travel to the fishing grounds costs time
and money. In order to incorporate these features into the analysis in a reasonably
simple manner, the spatial dimensions can be collapsed to a single dimension,
distance from port. However, what form is appropriate for the relationship be-
tween fish density and distance from port?
Suppose that the density of the fish biomass has a global maximum at a par-
ticular distance from port. A commerical fisherman would never knowingly fish at
locations beyond this point; to do so would require additional time and fuel but
would result in lower catch rates. Therefore, concerning the analysis of a fisher-40 D. B. Sampson
man's choice of fishing location, the only relevant portion of the fish density
function is the region between the fishing port and the point of maximum fish
density. Within this region a linear model seems a reasonable first approximation.
In this paper it is assumed that the spatial density (D) for the biomass of a fish
stock can be represented by a piecewise linear function of the distance from the
fishing port (d) and that the density gradient (G) is independent of the size of the
fish stock. The total biomass of the fish stock (B) is represented by the triangular
area under the density function. Reductions in the biomass cause a shift offshore
in the density (Figure 1). It is also assumed that the fish are confined to a fixed
range (R) from port and that the fish biomass is never so large that fish occur at
the fishing port; there always exists a positive minimum distance (dmin) that a
fishing vessel must travel in order to reach any fish. Given these assumptions, the




where dmin = R - (2
. if (d < dmin) or (R < d)
. otherwise
This model might be suitable for a stock of pelagic fish that lives primarily off-
shore but which spreads inshore during periods of high abundance.
An even simpler model for the spatial density of the fish is one in which
reductions in the fish stock change the density gradient G rather than the mini-
mum distance dmin. Such a formulation might reasonably mimic the characteris-
tics of a fish population in which the different spatial regions have varying capac-
ities for attracting and supporting fish; the relative densities do not vary with
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Figure I. Piecewise linear approximation for the relationship between the density of the
fish biomass and the distance from the port over the range from the port to the location of
maximum fish density.Fishing Technology and Fleet Dynamics 41
system based on such a model differs little from the behavior of the system that
is considered in this paper. Of course, the details of the mathematical relation-
ships are different.
Numerous mechanisms might govern the dynamics of the spatial distribution
of a fish population: avoidance of predators, competition for food or shelter, the
availability of spawning habitat. Understanding the complex spatial patterns seen
in natural communities has long been, and continues to be, a focus of ecological
research (Pielou, 1974; Krebs, 1978). Nevertheless, a fisherman's major concern
is where he can find suitable concentrations offish. The spatial density function
used in this paper is a plausible, though stylized, representation offish distribution
for that range of locations that is relevant to a fisherman. It can be viewed as a
special case of MacCall's (1990) basin model for the spatial distribution of a fish
population.
Many fishing fieets consist of relatively small vessels that cannot, or usually do
not, remain overnight at sea. For these vessels the duration of each fishing trip is
virtually constant. Even for larger vessels that can remain offshore for extended
periods, the duration of a trip is often predetermined by such things as fuel
capacity or the wishes of the crew. Assume that the duration of each fishing trip
(T) is fixed and therefore that the amount of time spent fishing (tF) is determined
by the speed at which the vessel steams to the fishing ground (V, a constant) and
by the distance from port at which fishing occurs,
tF = T - 2 • d/V.
The quantity (2 • dA') is the amount of time required to travel a distance d and
return.
Because the duration of a trip is fixed, there exists a maximum distance which
a vessel can cover on a trip,
dmax = 1/2 • V T.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the range of the fish stock always exceeds the
maximum trip distance, dmax < R.
The assumption that the duration of a fishing trip is fixed and therefore inde-
pendent of the size of the catch implies that the capacity of the fish hold is never
a binding constraint. Otherwise, a trip would be cut short when very large catches
were made. This assumption may be violated in fisheries in which fish are very
abundant or in which there are regulations that restrict landings per trip. Sampson
(1991) considers the problem of fishing location choice when catch per trip is the
binding constraint.
The catch per fishing trip (C) is determined jointly by the density of the fish (D)
and by the amount of time spent fishing (tF),
C = q • D tF
where q is the catch rate while fishing. This equation is analogous to the standard
"catch equation" of fisheries science (Gulland, 1983). Parameter q is usually
described as the ' 'catchability coefficient''. This formulation of the catch equation42 D. B. Sampson
ignores the vessel's removals offish and its movement on the fishing grounds. It
is assumed that there are negligible changes in fish density during the period of
fishing.
As a function of distance from port, the catch rate is quadratic over a range of
distances.
To . . . if (d < dmin) or (dmax < d)
~ [2 • q • G • (d-dmin) • (dmax-d)/V . . . otherwise.
The maximum catch rate occurs at a distance halfway between the minimum and
maximum trip distances.
The major fisheries in the developed world all make extensive use of fuel, for
traveling to and from the fishing grounds and for deploying and operating the
fishing gear. In many fisheries the expenditures on fuel are a large portion of the
operating costs. Poffenberger (1985) summarizes the results from surveys of ves-
sels that fished for reef fish off the United States in the South Atlantic during
1980-81. For vessels that fished with longlines, fuel costs were about 49% of
operating costs exclusive of labor; for vessels that fished with handlines, they
were about 37%. Warren and Griffin (1980) give annual summaries for 1971-77 of
the variable and fixed costs for vessels that trawled for shrimp in the Gulf of
Mexico. In 1971 fuel costs were about 29% of operating costs exclusive of labor;
in 1977 they were about 43%. Billington (1988) states that in New Zealand fuel
costs as a percentage of earnings can be as high as 30% for coastal trawlers but as
low as only 5% for passive fishing methods such as long-lining or gill-netting.
Suppose that a fishing vessel consumes fuel at rate uS while steaming to and
from the fishing grounds and at rate uF while fishing. The cost of fuel (cE, cost of
energy) per fishing trip is a linear function of the distance from port,
cE = pE • [uF tF + uS (T - tF)],
cE = pE • [uF • T + (uS - uF) • (2/V) • d],
where pE is the unit price for fuel (energy). If the rate of fuel consumption while
steaming is less than the rate of fuel consumption while fishing, then the energy
costs per trip decline as the distance from port increases. Fishing vessels that use
trawls probably have these technical characteristics. Trawlers must apply pow-
erful engines while fishing in order to overcome the drag of the net. Fishing
vessels that operate long-lines or gill nets however use relatively little fuel while
fishing.
Each fishing trip generates costs for wages and for such things as food and
routine maintenance. The operating costs per fishing trip (oc) are the sum of the
fuel costs, the labor costs (cL), and the other miscellaneous costs (cM),
oc = cE + cL -h cM.
In some fisheries the members of the crew are not paid a wage; instead, or in
addition, they receive a share of the catch (Holmsen, 1969; Sutinen, 1979; Ander-
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revenue after payment of expenses such as food and fuel. In this paper it is
assumed that the crew members are paid wages and that they also receive a share
(S) of the gross revenues. Furthermore, in order to simplify the analysis, it is
assumed that the owner of the vessel is also the skipper. The skipper/owner
decides when and where to fish and he pays the operating costs, including some
reasonable w^e for himself, from his share of the trip revenue.
The flow of revenue to the skipper/owner (SR, the skipper's revenue per
fishing trip) is given by
SR = p • (1 - S) • C
where p denotes the unit price for fish. It is assumed that the catch by any single
vessel is small relative to the catch by the fleet and therefore that each skipper
must accept the going price for fish. Figure 2 illustrates possible relationships
between the skipper's revenue and the operating costs as functions of distance
from port.
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Figure 2. Skipper's revenue and operating costs as functions of distance from port.44 D. B. Sampson
distance from port for which the value of the marginal product (VMP, the deriv-
ative of the skipper's revenue with respect to the distance from port) is equal to
the marginal factor costs (MFC, the derivative of the operating costs with respect
to distance from port).
VMP =
0 . . . if (d < dmin) or (dmax < d)
p • (1 - S) • 2 • q G ... otherwise.
.- (dmin + dmax - 2 - d)/V
MFC = pE • (uS - uF) • 2/y.
It follows that the optimum distance for fishing (d*) is given by
pE - (uS - uF)
d* = 1/2 • (dmin + dmax) - Vi
p (1 - S) q G'
As a function of fish price (or as a function of the catchability coefilcient), the
optimum distance is a rectangular hyperbola with a vertical asymptote at a fish
price equal to zero and a horizontal asymptote at a distance equal to the average
of dmin and dmax. The approach to the horizontal asymptote is from above if the
rate of use of fuel while steaming (uS) is less than the rate of use of fuel while
fishing (uF); otherwise the approach is from below. Other things being equal, one
would expect to find trawlers operating further offshore than long-liners. With
respect to fish biomass, the optimum distance is a strictly decreasing function.
Figure 3 illustrates these relationships. If the rate of use of fuel while steaming is
equal to the rate of use of fuel while fishing, then the optimum distance is halfway
between dmin and dmax.
The skipper will not engage in a fishing trip unless his share of the trip revenue
is sufficient to cover all the operating costs (e.g.. the dotted revenue curves in
Figure 2). The inequality SR(d*) > oc(d*) must be satisfied if fishing is to occur.
As a consequence, there exists a minimum supply price (pmin). For a given level
offish biomass, the skipper does not operate his vessel unless the price for fish
exceeds this minimum. The minimum supply price is given by the positive root of
a quadratic equation.
_ -k2 + {k2^- [pE • (uS - uF) • (dmax -
pmm -
(1 - S) - (q • G/V) • (dmax - dmin)^
where ^2 = -{kl + [pE • (uS - uF)A'] • (dmin + dmax)},
kl = cL + cM + pE • uF • T.
By similar logic, for a given fish price there exists a minimum economic bio-
mass (Bmin); the skipper does not operate his vessel unless the fish biomass
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Figure 3. Optimum distance for fishing as a function of the price for fish (the upper panel)
and as a function of the biomass of the fish stock (the lower panel).




pE • (uS - uF) [4 • dmax • pE • (uS - uF) + 2 • V • kl
p • (1 - S) q G p • (1 - S) • q • G
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the minimum supply price and the
minimum economic biomass. The points on the curve are the combinations offish
price and fish biomass for which the skipper can just cover his operating costs.
As long as the price for fish is greater than the minimum supply price, the
vessel fishes at the optimum distance and the fish from each trip are caught and








Figure 4. Relationship between the minimum economic biomass and the minimum supply
price.
C* = C(d*),
C* = (qA') • {V^ G • [(dmax - -H (dmax - R) (2 G • B)"' + B]}
where ^ = [pE • (uS - uF)]/[p (1 - S) q Gl.
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Figure 5. A fishing vessel's short-run supply curve.Fishing Technology and Fleet Dynamics 47
inverse of the optimum catch per trip as a function of fish price. Figure 5, for
example, shows the catch per trip that a vessel produces for any particular level
of fish price. To a limited extent the skipper adjusts his activities (fishing location
and catch rate) in response to short-run movements in fish prices. In contrast, the
short-run supply function in Doll (1988) is perfectly inelastic with respect to fish
price.
In most bioeconomic models for fisheries, fishing effort is measured only in
terms of the numbers of vessels in the fieet; no explicit provisions are made for the
amount of time spent fishing. Furthermore, it is usually assumed that the cost of
a unit of fishing effort is constant. However, in terms of the catch equation, and
for the models used in this paper, fishing effort is the amount of time that the
fishing gear is deployed. The fishing time and the operating costs are determined
by the optimum fishing distance; the optimum fishing distance varies with the fish
price and with the fish biomass. The costs of a unit of fishing effort are a function
of both the demand for fish and the biomass of the fish stock.
The Long-Run Analysis
In the short-run the individual skipper/owner operates his vessel whenever the
revenues from a fishing trip exceed the operating costs, and, for the duration of a
fishing trip, the biomass of the fish stock can be treated as a constant. In a
long-run model these characteristics are inappropriate. Each vessel owner must
receive a reasonable return on his investment; otherwise he will sell his vessel and
invest his money elsewhere. Also, the catches by the fishing fleet will alter the
biomass of the stock if the aggregate rate of catch by the fleet is not exactly
balanced by the rate at which the fish population replenishes itself.
Consider first the long-run performance of a fishing vessel. Unless the vessel
can be used in some other productive activity, in the long-run the revenues from
fishing must cover those costs that accrue to the vessel owner regardless of
whether the vessel makes any fishing trips. The flow of fixed costs is determined
by the purchase price for the vessel, including some reasonable return on capital,
plus the total, over the life of the vessel, of the taxes, insurance, license fees, and
maintenance charges all divided by the working life span of the vessel. The profits
or losses from the fishing enterprise fiow at a rate determined by the difference
between the fiow of fixed costs and the flow of net income.
Provided that the fish biomass is greater than the minimum economic biomass
(this is equivalent to the condition that the fish price is greater than the minimum
supply price), the fiow of profits (PR) to the skipper/owner is equal to
PR = SR(d*) - oc(d*) - fc,
PR = p • (1 - S) • q • G [(dmax - dmin)^ - w2]/(2 - V)




W = pE • (uS - uF)/[p (1 - S) q Gl4S D. B. Sampson
and fc denotes the flow of fixed costs. If the fish biomass is less than the minimum
economic biomass (if fish price is less than the minimum supply price), then the
vessel does not go fishing and losses accrue at a rate equal to the flow of fixed
costs. Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between profit fiow and fish biomass for
two levels of fish price.
The level of fish biomass at which the fiow of profits is zero (BB, the
breakeven biomass. Figure 6) is given by
BB = G • (Z' -
where
Z' = dmax +
pE • (uS - uF)
p • (1 - S) q • G
dmax • pE - (uS - uF) + 2 • V • kl'
p • (I - S) • q • G
kl' = cL + cM + pE • uF • T + fc = kl + fc.
The equation for the breakeven biomass differs from the equation for the mini-
mum economic biomass only in the presence of fixed costs in the term k I' for the
breakeven biomass.
The exact expression for the fiow of profits is unwieldy but the following
piecewise linear function provides a reasonable approximation.
PR -
- fc
SR' - oc' - fc




Figure 6. Skipper's flow of profits as a function of the biomass of the fish stock.Fishing Technology and Fleet Dynamics 49
where SR' = p • (1 - S) • q • V • [T/(2 • R)P • B and
oc' = cL -*- cM -H pE • (uS + uF) • T/2.
SR' is an approximation for the skipper's revenue. SR(d*); oc' is an approxima-
tion for the operating costs oc(d*). These relationships can be derived by assum-
ing that the fishing occurs at half of dmax whenever B is greater than Bmin.
In the derivation of the expressions for profit fiow and breakeven biomass it
was assumed that the price for fish is unaffected by the aggregate landings of the
fleet; the fish price at the port is determined by markets elsewhere and these
markets are supplied by numerous independent fishing fieets. (In the short-run
analysis it was assumed that the fish price in the local market was unaffected by
the catch of any individual vessel.) If the fish price is not external to the system,
the analysis becomes considerably more complicated; fish price and vessel profits
are then functions of the aggregate catch and this is a function of both the fish
biomass and the fieet size.
If existing vessels in the fieet make super-normal profits, which occurs when-
ever the fish biomass is greater than the breakeven biomass, then new vessels will
join the fleet. If existing vessels make losses, which occurs whenever the fish
biomass is less than the breakeven biomass, then some will leave the fleet. At
equilibrium each vessel in the fieet generates revenues that are just sufficient to
cover the operating costs plus the flow of fixed costs; the fish biomass is at the
breakeven level.
It seems reasonable to suppose that the dynamics of the fleet are governed by
a differential equation of the following form.
dE
- = e.PR.
where E denotes the number of vessels in the fleet and e is the entry/exit coeffi-
cient.
Some authors (e.g., Clark, 1985; Allen and McGlade, 1986) have theorized that
the rate of vessel entry is proportional to the aggregate profits of the fleet
(e • PR • E) rather than to the profits of an individual vessel (e • PR). Such a
formulation implies that the rate of entry to the fleet would be the same for a fieet
of 10 vessels each making $1000 profit per year as it would be for a fleet of 100
vessels each making only $100 profit per year. This seems an unrealistic propo-
sition.
Another formulation for fishing vessel dynamics allows the entry coefficient to
have different values depending on whether profits are positive or negative
(Smith, 1969; Clark et al., 1979; Clark, 1980). Because fishing vessels are spe-
cialized and therefore cannot readily be used in activities other than fishing, these
authors contend that vessels exit from a fishery less easily than they enter. How-
ever, fishing vessels usually can be moved without difficulty to other fishing ports
and there participate in the harvest of different fish stocks. This apparently oc-
curred during the development of the fur seal industry in the North Pacific (Wilen,
1976). In an empirical analysis of the North Sea herring fishery, Bjorndal and50 D. B. Sampson
Conrad (1987) did not find signficiant support for the hypothesis "that entry in
response to positive profits is more elastic than exit due to negative profits."
Consider now the dynamics of the fish stock. Naturally occurring populations
of fish tend to persist through time and, in the absence of removals by fishing
operations, the size of a population tends to remain approximately constant. One
simple model that incorporates these features is the logistic model for population
growth. It has been widely used in analyses of biological systems (Pielou, 1974;
Krebs, 1978) and, despite its imperfections (Larkin, 1977; Fletcher and Deriso,
1988), the logistic model remains well-established as a theoretical model in fish-
eries science (Graham, 1935; Schaefer, 1954; Ricker, 1975; Gulland, 1983; Barber,
1988).
In the logistic model the population's instantaneous growth rate is a simple
quadratic function of the current population biomass,
dB
-^ = r B (1 - B/K).
Parameter r is the intrinsic rate of growth at low biomass and K is the carrying
capacity of the environment. In the absence of harvesting, the population has two
equilibrium levels, either at zero or at the carrying capacity. Maximum growth
occurs when the population is at half of the carrying capacity and the growth rate
there is often described as the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). The MSY
provides a natural upper limit to the long-run rate of harvesting.
The change in the size of the fish stock is determined by the balance between
the natural rate of population growth and the rate of removals by fishing. Suppose
the fishing fleet that exploits this fish stock consists of some number of identical
vessels that operate independently and without interference. (There are no in-
creasing or diminishing returns to fishing effort.) The rate of aggregate yield by the
fleet is given by the product of the number of fishing vessels and the optimum
catch rate by an individual vessel (E • C*). It follows therefore that the dynamics
of the fish stock are governed by the following differential equation,
dB
— = r B (1 - B/K) -EC*.
If the natural rate of growth is exactly balanced by the rate of aggregate yield,
then the biomass of the fish stock remains constant. Provided that the biomass is
greater than the minimum economic biomass, the relationship between the equi-
librium biomass and the fleet size is given by the largest root of the following
equation,
al B^ -I- a2 B -H a3 • B'^^ -F a4 = 0
where al = -r/K, a2 = r - q • E/V,
a3 = q • (E/V) • (R - dmax) • (2 • G)"\ and
a4 = G • q • E • [(R - dmax)^ - W^]/(2 • V).Fishing Technology and Fleet Dynamics 51
If the biomass is less than the minimum economic biomass, then no fishing occurs;
skippers do not operate their vessels unless they can cover their operating costs.
Because of this short-run constraint (no fishing unless Bmin < B), fishing
operations can never reduce the fish stock below the minimum economic biomass.
Unless fishermen are able to operate without incurring any costs, or unless the
price for fish is infinite, the fish population will never be fished to extinction.
Clark (1973) comes to a similar conclusion for the case of optimal harvesting by
the sole owner of a renewable resource. Extinction of the resource will occur
under present-value maximization if and only if two conditions are satisfied. The
maximum reproductive potential (r) must be sufficiently smaller than the discount
rate and there must be an "immediate profit. . . from harvesting the last remain-
ing animals." In an open-access fishery the effective discount rate is infinite
(Clark, ibid.), hence the first condition is satisfied. However, fishing generates
losses whenever the biomass of the fish stock is less than the minimum economic
biomass.
The conclusion that extinction is impossible relies on the presence of a positive
rate of population growth when the stock size has been reduced to the level of the
minimum economic biomass. Some authors have postulated the existence of a
threshold stock size below which the growth rate is zero or negative (Smith, 1969;
Clark, 1985; Anderson, 1986). If this minimum viable population size was greater
than the minimum economic biomass, then the population would suffer biological
extinction. However, it seems uniikly that a population would ever develop such
characteristics. The ancestors of today's populations must have survived innu-
merable periods of low abundance during their evolution. There seems little rea-
son why a population would lose the ability to grow at low densities. Furthermore,
few populations exist in complete isolation. Immigrants from neighboring popu-
lations would recolonize any region from which all individuals had been removed.
The behavior of the fishery system through time is governed by two coupled
differential equations, one for the size of the fishing fleet and one for the size of
the fish biomass. All the information about the dynamic behavior of the system is
incorporated into the ratio of the two differential equations. This ratio is a differ-
ential equation in B and E and its solutions can be represented by curves in the B
/ E plane, the phase plane. When solution trajectories cross the graph of equilib-
rium biomass versus fleet size, they must travel in a direction parallel to the E
axis; when they cross the graph of breakeven biomass versus fleet size, they must
travel parallel to the B axis (Figure 7). Any points of intersection of these two
graphs represent equilibria. In this system there is a single stable equilibrium; all
solution trajectories converge to this point.
The phase plane diagram in Figure 7 differs in one fundamental respect from
those usually given in the literature. Solution trajectories cannot cross into the
region that is bounded on the right by the line B = Bmin. Solution trajectories
cannot intersect the biomass axis.
Technical "Progress" in a Hypothetical Fishery
The long-run flow of profits from a fishing enterprise is determined by the price for
flsh and by the biomass of the fish stock; these aspects of the fishery cannot be










Figure 7. Phase plane diagram for the number of fishing vessels and the biomass of the fish
stock.
by the technical characteristics of the fishing vessel, things such as the type of
fishing gear or the size of the engine and hence the rate of fuel consumption.
Within certain limits, the skipper/owner can modify the attributes of his vessel and
thereby improve the profitability of his fishing activities.
Suppose two kinds of fishing technology are available, an active one; charac-
terized by high fuel consumption (uF), catch rates (q), and fixed costs (fc); and a
passive one; characterized by low fuel consumption (uF'), catch rates (q'), and
fixed costs (fc'). For example, trawling could be classified as an active technology
and long-lining could be classified as a passive one. Suppose that the other tech-
nical characteristics, such as labor costs and vessel speed, are identical for both
technologies.
The ascending portion of the graph of vessel profitability versus fish biomass
is approximately linear with slope proportional to the catchability coefficient.
Because the active type of vessel has a larger catchability coefficient (q > q') and
has a larger fiow of fixed costs (fc > fc'), the profitability graphs for the two types
of vessel have a single point of intersection. In Figure 8 this point of equal prof-
itability occurs where fish biomass is equal to B*. Depending on the price for fish
and on the other technical characteristics, the point of equal profitability lies
either above or below the zero profit line and it lies either to the left or right of the
carrying capacity (K).
Unless the profit flow at the point of equal profitability is exactly equal to zero,
in the long-run there can be only one type of vessel in the fieet. In Figure 8, when
the biomass is at the breakeven level for the active vessels, the passive vessels
make positive profits. Therefore, in the long-run the skippers of active vessels all
convert to passive vessels and at equilibrium the fishing fieet consists exclusively
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Figure 8. Profitability of "active" versus "passive" flshing technologies as functions of
the biomass of the fish stock.
This conclusion, that only one type of vessel can persist in the system, is valid
only if there are stable prices for fish and for fuel. For example. Figure 9 compares
the long-run average cost curves for two fleets.' One fieet consists exclusively of
the active type of fishing vessel and the other consists exclusively of the passive
type. If the price for fish is above the level marked p*, then the active vessels
produce the given rate of catch at lower average cost than the passive vessels; the
active vessels are more economically efficient. If the price for fish is below the
level marked p*, then the passive vessels are more economically efficient. In the
lower panel of Figure 9 the price for fuel has been halved, perhaps because of a
change in fuel tax or a direct subsidy. This results in a significantly lower level for
fish price (p*) at which the different technologies produce catches at the same
average cost. The relative profitability of the different fishing technologies de-
pends on the fish prices and on the price for fuel and the other factors of produc-
tion.
Consider now the evolution of this hypothetical fishery system. If the point of
equal profitability for the two fishing technologies lies above the zero profit line
and to the left of the carrying capacity, as shown in Figure 8 for example, then, as
the fishery develops from an initially unexploited state, there is a switch in the
preferred type of fishing vessel as illustrated in Figure 10. At first, the active type
of vessel is the more profitable but, as the biomass of the fish stock declines below
the level of equal profitability, the passive vessels become the more profitable and
the skippers convert from active to passive vessels.^ In Figure 10 the initial
investment in fishing vessels is excessive; the fish biomass overshoots the equi-
librium level and this results in a second burst of investment in active vessels.
Many empirical investigations of technological progress have found that the
time path for the proportion of firms that adopt a new technology can be described
by a logistic or other S-shaped curve (Stoneman, 1983). The adoption of a new





























Figure 9. Long-run average cost curves for two fleets of vessels, one with active techno-
logical characteristics, the other with passive technological characteristics.
about it. However, as the superiority of the new technology becomes evident,
there follows a period of rapid diffusion and the eventual replacement of the older
technology. Various theoretical models for the diffusion of new technologies also
predict time paths that conform to this general shape (Stoneman, ibid.). For the
case of fishing technology, however, the situation can be very different. Because
the relative profitability of a given fishing technology is directly related to the fish
stock abundance, which, in turn, is governed by the rate of harvesting by the
current mix of fishing technologies, the spread of technology in fishing is subject
to interactions that do not usually occur in an industry such as farming or man-
ufacturing.
Concluding Remarks
The example in the previous section illustrates some of the complexities that can
arise during the development of a fishery. In a mature fishery, in which the fish
stock has already been reduced to a level near equilibrium, similarly complex
behavior can be forced on the system by movements in fish prices or factor prices














Figure 10. Evolution of a hypothetical fishery system consisting of a fish stock and a fleet
of fishing vessels with active or passive technological characteristics.
If the investment decisions by fishermen, and therefore the size and compo-
sition of the fleet, are influenced exclusively by the relative profitability of the
available fishing technologies, then the equation that describes the profitability of
a vessel should indicate the likely conditions under which different kinds of tech-
nical innovations will be adopted. Fishermen will not use new technology unless
it increases profitability.
For the models in this paper the flow of vessel revenues at equilibrium is
approximately proportional to the product of the catchability coefficient (q) and
the vessel speed (V) and these parameters do not appear directly in the cost
function. Innovations that increase either of these technical characteristics will be
adopted only if the additional flow of revenue is greater than the additional flow
of costs. Also, vessel revenues increase approximately in proportion to the square
of the duration of a fishing trip (T) but the operating costs increase in proportion
to T. This may account for the tendency to develop larger and larger fishing
vessels that operate further and further from port for longer and longer periods of
time.56 D. B. Sampson
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Notes
I. For a given fishing fleet the long-run average cost curve can be derived from the
equation for the aggregate equilibrium catch. At equilibrium, the catch by the fleet (Y) is
equal to the biological productivity and the biomass of the fish stock is equal to the
breakeven biomass,
Y = E • C* - r • BB(p) • [I - BB(p)/K].
The long run-average cost curve is the inverse of Y(p).
2. In solving for tbe vessel trajectories shown in Figure 10 it was assumed that the size
and composition of the fishing fleet was governed by the following differential equations,
P ... if PRp < PRA
. . . otherwise,
... if PRp < PRA
\ ... otherwise,
where the variables subscripted with ' 'A'' are for the active type of fishing vessel and f is
the rate coefficient for the conversion from one type of vessel to the other. Any vessels that
join the fleet are of the type that is currently more profitable; any vessels that leave tbe fleet
are of the type that is currently less profitable. Fishermen convert their vessels from the
less to the more profitable technology and the rate of conversion depends on the cun-ent
difference in profitability and on the current number of the less profitable vessels.
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